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ABSTRACT 
The Effect of DNA Databases on Plea Bargaining. (May 2014) 
Sarah Kathleen Armstrong 
Department of Economics 
Texas A&M University 
 
Research Advisor: Dr. Jonathon Meer 
Department of Economics 
 
Plea bargaining is a defining characteristic of the United States criminal justice system; 
according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, 95% of the 1,079,000 felons convicted in state 
courts during 2004 pleaded guilty rather than face jury by trail.1 Despite the prominence of plea 
negotiations in the American judiciary, the implications of this process have not been subject to 
analysis that sufficiently matches its importance. Meanwhile, the increasing use of high-tech law 
enforcement tools like DNA databases, which increase the probability that repeat offenders are 
caught for their crimes, affect parties’ relative bargaining power and incentives. Most 
importantly, defendants have an incentive to negotiate lesser charges in order to avoid being 
added to their state’s DNA database, in exchange for longer sentences. We examine whether the 
introduction and expansion of DNA databases across the United States have affected plea 
bargaining by defendants. We use difference-in-differences analysis and State Court Process 
(SCP) data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics, which is collected every two years and tracks 
felony cases from charging by prosecutors until final disposition. We test for the impact of DNA 
database expansions on the likelihood of pleading guilty to a crime, the likelihood of charge 
bargaining, and other sentencing outcomes. Estimates provide evidence that database eligible 
offenders are more likely to accept charge bargains and less likely to accept sentence bargains 
                                                             
1 BJS (2011). 
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relative to defendants that do not face database collection, indicating that plea bargaining may 
help parties involved in plea negotiations to assist offenders in avoiding DNA database 
registration.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Despite the prominence of plea negotiations in the American judiciary, the implications of this 
process have not been subject to analysis that sufficiently matches its importance. In identifying 
whether there exists a connection between plea bargaining and DNA databases, we expand our 
understanding of plea negotiations, as well as more completely identify the role of DNA 
profiling in the criminal justice system by observing how it influences defendant behavior 
through this defining characteristic of the American judiciary. 
While the economic literature concerning plea bargaining and DNA profiling can be identified 
by a relatively small number of studies,2 both plea negotiation behavior and that of defendants 
facing DNA profiling can be partially explained by Becker’s (1968) model of criminal decision-
making. Outlining how individuals compare the expected costs and benefits of committing a 
crime, the model defines the expected cost of committing a crime as a function of the probability 
of conviction (conditional on reoffending), a discount factor and the punishment.3 Increasing the 
expected value of these cost-factors reduce individual incentive to offend, and the model predicts 
that an individual will commit a crime only if: 
E(Beneﬁt) > E(Cost) = f(τ, δ, ρ) | I(Incarcerated) = 0  
where τ := probability of conviction, δ := discount rate, ρ := punishment and I(Incarcerated) 
indicates whether the individual is incarcerated at time of decision. 
 
                                                             
2 A review of literature concerning plea bargaining and DNA profiling is included below.  
3 Sentence length is chosen as the punishment of interest in this paper. 
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A key focus of this literature considers the effectiveness of deterrence, a policy strategy to reduce 
recidivism rates by increasing the expected costs of committing crime by increasing τ or ρ.4 
Increasing use of high-tech law enforcement tools raises the probability that offenders are 
caught, and policy-makers have looked to DNA databases and DNA profiling of criminals as an 
effective method of decreasing recidivism. The overall impact of a policy on crime can depend 
on both the effect of deterrence and an incapacitation effect, which is determined by an 
individual being incarcerated5 and, consequently, physically unable to reoffend. This method of 
reducing crime is considerably more costly to the public relative to the use of databases in 
criminal investigations,6 so identifying the relative deterrence and incarceration effects of 
databases and plea negotiations—and, specifically, how negotiating defenders perceive the 
relative importance of τ (for future offenses) and the ρ they are negotiating—is an important 
policy question.  
If a negotiating defendant faces database entry and intends to reoffend upon release, they could 
potentially stop this increase in their probability of conviction for future crimes by seeking a 
bargain in which they are not entered into a database. In particular, the defendant has incentive to 
bargain their charges down to a less serious offense that does not qualify for DNA collection, 
which may likely be in exchange for some increase in the sentence. Identifying whether 
defendants are able to pay this “price” in order to avoid database entry provides insight into how 
defendants that are likely to reoffend perceive the relative importance of future τ and current ρ, 
as well as the relative magnitudes of the deterrence and incarceration effects of databases on 
criminal behavior. We find that, while DNA eligible offenders are generally less likely to plead 
                                                             
4 Specifically, by increasing the probability of future convictions, conditional on reoffending, and the determined 
punishment for the present crime 
5 Where the individual is convicted with probability τ 
6 INSERT: notes on prison population costs v. dna databases 
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guilty, they are more likely to accept charge bargains and less likely to accept sentence bargains 
relative to defendants that do not face database collection. 
 
Overview of Plea Bargaining 
A plea bargain can be thought of as a negotiation between the defense, prosecution and judge 
that settles a criminal case short of trial and is treated as a contract between prosecutors and 
defendants. Under this arrangement, a defendant agrees to plead guilty to some or all of the 
charges against them in exchange for concessions from the prosecution, including: a reduction in 
the number of charges, a reduction in the severity of charges, and/or a recommendation that the 
defendant receive a reduced sentence. 
Plea negotiations begin once a defendant has been arrested and charged with a crime. This 
process may result in two types of plea bargains: sentence bargains and charge bargains. Under a 
sentence bargain, the defendant may plead guilty to the original charge in exchange for a reduced 
sentence. Similarly, the prosecutor may offer the defendant to be charged with a lesser crime in 
order to secure a conviction. Because the specific charge affects the expected cost of other 
crimes (through the probability of getting caught), we assume that players’ utility is determined 
by both the charge name and length of the sentence. 7 Adopting the standard conceptualization of 
plea negotiations found in the literature, we assume that a plea bargain is offered once,8 with the 
case going to trial if the plea offer is rejected.  
                                                             
7 The game-theoretic literature of plea bargaining largely offers models that only consider sentence bargaining, 
assuming that defendants are influenced by the length of their incarceration, but not by the type of charge. See 
Bebchuk (1984), Grossman and Katz (1983), Reinganum (1988) and da Silveira (2012). The empirical literature, 
more similar to the strategy that we employ here, allows for variation in bargain type. See Agan (2013), Bjerk 
(2005), Kuziemko (2006) and Thaxton (2013). 
8 See Agan (2013), Kuziemko (2006) 
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The debate surrounding plea bargaining has been marked by varying forms of support and 
criticism. While some critics of plea bargains hold that the process allows defendants to get off 
too easily, many believe that it promotes prosecutorial coercion9 and undermines constitutional 
rights of defendants since entering into a bargain requires defendants to waive three rights 
protected by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, including: right to trial by jury, right against self-
incrimination and right to confront hostile witnesses. One concern is that risk-averse, potentially 
innocent, defendants may be easily convinced to cede these civil liberties when jury by trial 
could result in harsher punishment.10 Furthermore, some hold that equity in plea negotiations is 
undermined by an excess of prosecutorial discretion11 and that bargains can be shaped by 
personal biases of prosecutors.12 Characteristics that have been identified as connected to 
prosecutorial discretion and the likelihood of bargaining include: seriousness of current charge 
and the defendant’s prior record, strength of evidence, use of a private or public defender and the 
detention status of the defendant.13 Furthermore, the race of the defendant is thought to influence 
the likelihood that they will be offered a plea bargain, with black defendants being less likely to 
receive a reduced charge relative to white defendants.14 
                                                             
9 Finkelstein (1975) argues that prosecutorial coercion occurs under insufficient evidence.  
10 Dervan and Edkins (2013) find that, when study participants acting as defendants are provided with a specific 
probability of conviction for jury trial, they are relatively risk-adverse relative to when participants are offered a 
bargain without a specified probability of conviction. Also, it is generally recognized that defendants face harsher 
penalties if convicted through trial by jury for comparable offenses, with this harsher punishment being a product 
of prosecutorial discretion. See Albonetti (1991), Britt (2000), Dixon (1995), Engen and Gainey (2000), King et al. 
(2005), Kurlychek and Johnson (2004), Piehl and Bushway (2007), Steffensmeier and Demuth (2000, 2001), 
Steffensmeier and Hebert (1999), Steffensmeier et al. (1993) and Ulmer and Bradley (2006). 
11 See Burke (2007), Finkelstein (1975) and Ma (2002). 
12 See Burke (2007) and Ma (2002). 
13 See Champion (1989), Kellough and Wortley (2002), Meyer and Gray (1997) and Ulmer and Bradley (2006). 
14 See Farnworth and Teske (1995), Johnson (2003), Kellough and Wortley (2002) and Ulmer and Bradley (2006). 
Research on the relationship between other demographic characteristics (e.g. sex and age) is inconclusive. 
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Despite these concerns, the Supreme Court of the United States maintains that plea negotiations 
are constitutional since defendants voluntarily enter into a bargain and are cognizant of potential 
consequences.15 Conversely, many hold that plea bargaining is an equitable practice16 and that it 
allows for greater efficiency, minimizing prosecutorial costs by circumventing time-consuming 
and expensive jury trials.17 
Rigorous analysis of plea negotiations is needed not only as a response to the contention that 
surrounds the procedure, but also for the prevalence of plea bargains in the American judiciary 
system. Of the 75,573 federal criminal cases that were concluded by trial or plea in 2003, 95% 
ended in a guilty plea.18 Despite the significant role of plea negotiations in the American criminal 
justice system, we do not understand the full impact of the process. Rigorous analyses are limited 
to a small number of empirical studies, with the majority of the literature offering game-theoretic 
models that conceptualize the negotiation process.19 The studies described below specifically 
examine behavioral changes of prosecutors and defendants in negotiations following changes in 
sentencing. 
                                                             
15 The Supreme Court of the United States has historically rejected arguments that plea bargaining is 
unconstitutional. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). 
16 See Bar-Gill and Gazal-Ayal (2006), Bowers (2008), Brown and Bunnell (2006), Goodman and Porter (2002), Lee 
(2005), and McDonald and Cramer (1992). 
17 See Stuntz (2004). 
18 See Pastore and Maguire (2003). The literature estimates that the proportion of criminal cases concluded by 
plea bargains in the United States to be between 90 and 95 percent (Bureau of Justice Statistics (2005), Flanagan 
and Maguire (1990)). 
19 Landes (1971) offers the first economics-based analysis of plea bargaining, examining how the process conserves 
resources by reducing the input demanded from both the prosecution and defense.19 Landes theorizes that, the 
lesser the sentence faced if convicted at trial and the greater a trial imposes a resource cost to the defendant 
relative to the negotiated plea, the more likely the defendant is to plead guilty. This prompted a number of 
subsequent papers that considered variations of the model developed by Landes (Rhodes (1976), Weimer D.L. 
(1978), Forst & Brosi (1977), Reinganum (1988)). Grossman (1983) models how plea bargaining can reduce the 
overall societal cost of a wrongful conviction, since the interest of the state should coincide with that of an 
innocent defendant, and how plea bargaining functions as a screening device by prompting guilty defendants to 
self-select into a guilty plea, evening the asymmetrical distribution of information between the defense and 
prosecution. Bebchuk (1984) models litigation and settlement processes under imperfect information to identify 
the likelihood of settlement and settlement amount. 
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Agan (2013) considers whether the presence of a sex offender registry cause the cases of those 
accused of sex crimes to more or less likely end in plea bargaining. Using a difference-in-
differences (DD) strategy, 20 Agan compares plea and sentencing outcomes of accused sex 
offenders with those accused of other violent crimes before and after the effective dates of 
registry laws.21 Agan employs a sample of felony cases from the Bureau of Justice Statistics 
(BJS) State Court Process (SCP) 22 that was collected every two years between 1990 and 2004,23 
integrating this with state-level effective dates for registration.24 Plea bargaining by accused sex 
offenders increased after registration went into effect, relative to other violent offenders and 
defendants accused of sex crimes were more likely to plead guilty to the same offense they were 
charged with compared to other violent offenders. Agan interprets this as an increase in the 
prosecutor’s bargaining power since “sex offenders were less likely to receive more ‘generous’ 
charge bargains” (Agan, 21).25 
Kuziemko (2006) examines whether the threat of capital punishment causes defendants charged 
with potentially capital crimes to enter plea bargains in exchange for lesser sentences. Kuziemko 
employs two separate identification strategies through which she: (a) exploits a natural 
experiment prompted by the 1995 reconstitution of capital punishment in New York to allow for 
                                                             
20 Similar to difference-in-difference strategy used in Kuziemko (2006) study on the effect of death penalty on plea 
bargaining by accused murderers. 
21 Defendants arrested for violent crimes that are not sex offenses are considered the control group, as Agan holds 
that sex offender registry laws should not affect the behavior of this group. 
22 Same dataset used in Bjerk (2005) study on the effects of three-strike laws on plea bargaining. From ICPSR: cover 
40 counties (25 states); while not nationally representative, mean to represent the 75 most populous U.S. counties 
23 All included cases were filled in May of each year. Difference-in-differences employed to diminish state-year 
shocks. Agan includes state-fixed effects. The population includes sex offense cases, as well as other types of 
felony cases, that were filed in 70 U.S. counties. The data details the criminal offense charges, but does not note if 
these are arrest or charge offenses; the adjudication outcome, i.e. whether the process ended with a trial 
conviction, guilty plea, dismissal, or acquittal; the conviction offense; and the sentencing. 
24 This data is taken from Agan (2011). Six states represented in this data had a registry for the entire sample 
period. The effective date of registry laws for these states would not properly capture the effect of registries on 
plea bargaining since these laws went into effect prior to the time period of the CPA data. 
25 Agan draws interpretation from Kuziemko (2006) conclusions. 
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a differences-in-differences-in-differences (DDD) analysis of felony charges in New York and 
(b) performs a DD analysis of a cross-section of 1988 murder cases across 33 counties. In 
response to the reinstatement of the death penalty, some district attorneys publicly rejected 
pursuing capital punishment, allowing Kuziemko to identify those defendants charged with 
murder26 in counties where district attorneys did pursue capital punishment after the 1995 statute 
went into effect as the treatment group for the DDD analysis.27 The cross-sectional data 
employed in the DD analysis included first-degree murder cases, as well as a variety of homicide 
cases, allowing Kuziemko to utilize cases in which the defendant was charged with second-
degree murder, or lesser charges, as the control group since these individuals would not face 
capital punishment under 1988 law. The results of both of analyses indicated that the potential 
for capital punishment encouraged defendants to accept harsher bargains, but did not increase the 
propensity of defendants to enter into a plea bargain. Kuziemko holds that these results indicate 
that, while capital punishment does not diminish the high costs associated with capital 
punishment trials, the threat of capital punishment does increase the bargaining power of the 
prosecution. 
In response to Kuziemko’s findings, Thaxton (2012) examines the impact of capital punishment 
on plea bargaining and concludes that the death penalty does in fact increase the likelihood of a 
defendant to plead guilty. Thaxton argues that Kuziemko’s results are inherently flawed due to 
selection bias caused by the assumption that the threat of the death penalty affects the decision-
                                                             
26 Kuziemko considers defendants charged with both first- and second-degree murder in response to the expansion 
of the definition of first-degree murder in the 1995 statute. Prior to the 1995 change, first-degree murder only 
included the willful killing of a law-enforcement officer and second-degree murder denoted various homicide 
offenses. 
27 Kuziemko identifies defendants arrested for burglary, forcible rape, or armed robbery as the control group. This 
was performed using individual-level, time-series data that included all felony charges in New York between 1985 
and 1998. 
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making process of the defense in death-eligible cases, regardless of whether the death penalty 
was explicitly threatened. Thaxton holds that in reality prosecutors do not deem all death-eligible 
cases worth of capital punishment and that a defendant may not consider their case eligible for 
the death penalty; consequently, defendants not affected by the threat of capital punishment are 
likely included in the treatment group.28, 29 Thaxton also notes that Kuziemko’s selection of New 
York as the jurisdiction of interest is problematic in that the New York death penalty is relatively 
inactive,30 which could undermine the external validity of her research. Thaxton employs data on 
homicide cases in Georgia between 1993 and 2000 that Thaxton holds accurately details 
prosecutorial decisions to seek capital punishment and, therefore, corrects the selection bias 
issues present in the Kuziemko analysis. Thaxton employs a conditional fixed-effects logit model 
to determine that the threat of capital punishment increases the likelihood that death-eligible 
cases will end with a guilty plea. 
Bjerk (2005) similarly examines the relationship between mandatory minimum sentencing laws 
and prosecutorial discretion. The presented descriptive statistics and results of probit model 
analysis, cause Bjerk to conclude that prosecutorial discretion (i.e. plea bargaining) diminishes 
the effectiveness of mandatory minimum sentencing laws; specifically that prosecutors are more 
                                                             
28 While Kuziemko’s assumption may not hold as strongly as she argues, the threat of capital punishment should 
still impact the decision calculus of the defense in any death-eligible case, regardless of the degree to which the 
prosecution actually threatens capital punishment. That being said, we are unlikely to encounter equivalent issues 
in our consideration of the impact of DNA databases since the presence of DNA-evidence is determined prior to 
plea negotiations and the death penalty can only be threatened prior to sentencing. 
29 Thaxton does highlight an important issue in the data utilized by Kuziemko in that her sample population does 
not consider the process following sentencing. As Thaxton notes, most jurisdictions, including New York, allow 
offenders in capital cases to enter a plea bargain up until the penalty phase of their case. Plea bargaining could 
occur subsequently, though this issue should, again, not be found in our analysis of DNA databases and plea 
bargaining since there does not exist a legal precedent allowing those convicted to enter plea bargains in non-
capital cases (at least to my knowledge). 
30 An average of six death penalty notices per year were issued between 1995 and 2000. Additionally, only six 
offenders were considered to be members of “death row” by 2000 and no executions had occurred since the 1995 
reinstatement of capital punishment. 
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likely to reduce a felony charge to a misdemeanor if the initial charge would cause the defendant 
to be tried under the “three strikes” condition of a mandatory minimum sentencing law. Bjerk 
holds that, because plea bargaining allows for significant prosecutorial discretion, these 
negotiations undermine the deterrent effect mandatory minimum sentencing laws are presumed 
to enforce.31 
Rather than identify the effect of a particular treatment to sentencing as the studies above, Da 
Silveira (2012) analyzes a non-parametrically identified variation of the model developed by 
Bebchuk (1984) in order to identify how plea bargaining is generally affected by the harshness of 
trial-assigned sentencing. Specifically considering the reduction in minimum mandatory 
sentences and expansion in non-jail punishment for mild offenses, Da Silveira implements a non-
parametric estimator of the model using case-level data that details all criminal cases filed at the 
North Carolina Superior Courts between 1996 and 2009. Da Silveira estimates that, on average, 
cases will settle so that the defendant is receives approximately half of the sentence that would 
be assigned through trial conviction. Da Silveira concludes that prosecutors face high 
opportunity costs in going to trial, while defendants act as though trials are costless. 
Furthermore, Da Silveira finds that a reduction in mandatory minimum sentences reduces the 
total jail-time assigned by courts, while increasing the proportion of cases resulting in jail-time, 
and that an increase in alternative sentencing for less serious crimes reduces conviction rates and 
has no effect on total jail time assigned by the courts. 
Overview of DNA Databases 
Beginning in the 1980’s, state and federal legislation was enacted that required the collection of 
DNA samples from certain types of convicted criminal offenders. The usage of DNA analysis in 
                                                             
31 Bjerk uses Bureau of Justice Statistics data that includes cases in which defendants were arrested for a state 
felony between 1990 and 2000. U.S. Department of Justice, State Court Processing Statistics, 1990-2000. 
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the criminal justice system increased in the mid-1990’s, and the legislation authorizing the 
creation of a national DNA database was enacted by Congress in 1994.32 Since then, the usage of 
DNA databases has increased as federal statutes have expanded the scope of collection by 
including anyone arrested under the authority of the United States into the national database 
(known as the Combined DNA Index System, or CODIS), which also includes DNA profiles of 
offenders convicted of state and local crimes. CODIS is specifically comprised of the Local 
DNA Index System (LDIS), State DNA Index System (SDIS) and National DNA Index System 
(NDIS).33 Varying across states, DNA samples from certain types of arrestees and convicted 
offenders are included in these databases, with many states increasing the number of 
classifications of offenders added to these databases. The National Conference of State 
Legislatures (NCSL) lists 49 states as establishing DNA profiles for all convicted felons34 and 27 
states having authorized this for certain classifications of arrestees. 
In response to certain arrestees’ genetic information being entered into the database system 
without the individuals being convicted of any crime, Fourth Amendment and privacy debates 
have arose, prompting judicial hearings that ruled samples may be added to a DNA database if 
probable cause exists.35 Despite this contention, state legislation expanding DNA databases to 
include new categories of offenders is passed every year. The expansion of these databases has 
allowed investigators to more effectively leverage the potential of DNA analysis and, 
consequently, increasingly integrate DNA analysis into their practices. 
                                                             
32 42 U.S.C 14132(a) 
33 In order to make their DNA profiles nationally searchable, states must adhere to quality assurance standards 
mandated by the FBI. 
34 Idaho has not adopted this policy. The NCSL considers California to have the most expansive program concerning 
the collection of information on convicted criminals because it creates DNA profiles for all convicted felons and 
offenders of misdemeanors. 
35 These hearings occurred in Maryland, Minnesota and Tennessee. In Maryland v. King, the Supreme Court ruled 
that the collection of DNA profiles from arrestees is constitutional.  
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The rising demand for greater capacity for DNA analysis by policy-makers and criminal justice 
professionals is reflected by increases in federal funding opportunities that are available to state 
and local laboratories through the Justice for All Act.36 These initiatives include: expanding the 
capacity of state and local labs to analyze DNA samples,37 supporting the analysis of DNA 
samples by medical professionals in order to treat victims of sexual crimes (e.g. sexual assault 
examination programs)38 and supporting post-conviction DNA testing efforts.39  
DNA profiling is intended to increase the efficiency and accuracy of investigations and trials by 
comparing the DNA of potential offenders with crime scene evidence, effectively increasing the 
probability of accurate conviction. As DNA profiling and analysis technologies develop and the 
use of databases in criminal investigations increases, offenders will be further incentivized to 
avoid being charged with a crime that would require their DNA profile be shared with CODIS. 
The furthering of collection and analysis technologies, together with the expansion of potential 
profiles through state legislation, are establishing DNA profiling as an essential tool of the 
criminal justice system. However, little research has been produced on how this technology 
affects criminal behavior. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
36 H.R. 5107, Public Law 108-405 
37 The Debbie Smith Act of 2004—42 U.S.C.A. §§ 14136(a) through (d); $151 million appropriated to the attorney 
general for grants under subsection (a) for each of fiscal years 2009 through 2014 
38The DNA Sexual Assault Justice Act of 2004—42 U.S.C. 14136(e); $30 million is appropriated for each of fiscal 
years 2009 through 2014 
39The Innocence Protection Act of 2004 (Kirk Bloodsworth Post-Conviction DNA Testing Program)—42 U.S.C. 
14136(e); $5 million is appropriated for each of fiscal years 2005 through 2014 
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CHAPTER II 
METHODS 
 
Data Overview 
This paper uses data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ (BJS) State Court Processing (SCP) 
Statistics 1990-2009 database to identify how DNA collection legislation affects defendants’ 
plea negotiation behavior. The SCP Statistics are collected every two years, tracking a 
representative sample of felony cases that are filed in May of each collection year until final 
disposition.40 The dataset details several characteristics that determine whether or not a 
defendant qualifies for DNA collection, as well as when a defendant may qualify for DNA 
collection.41 For example, a non-juvenile criminal convicted of a felony in Alabama would have 
their DNA collected at incarceration after 1994, but someone (regardless of age) would have 
their DNA collected upon conviction if their conviction offense was categorized as a sex offense 
in Arizona in 1993. The inclusion of details concerning adjudication outcome (e.g. guilty plea 
and dismissal/acquittal) allows us to identify the relationship between the threat of DNA 
collection and plea outcomes. The dataset also includes demographic information, the number of 
prior arrests and convictions (as well as what these charges were) and the type of attorney 
representing the defendant.  
                                                             
40 Or for one year, whichever comes first. 
41 Most serious conviction charge, most serious conviction category, most serious conviction offense, most serious 
arrest charge, most serious arrest category, adjudication type, adjudication category, sentencing outcome, 
incarceration outcome, age and year of arrest. 
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DNA collection qualification was determined by whether an individual case included every 
characteristic necessary for qualification at time of arrest (May of arrest year). Consider the two 
examples given above for reference. The dataset does not contain specific variables for certain 
factors that determine qualification (e.g. whether a charge was a sex offense, or arson). In 
response to this, specific variables were created in order to represent these characteristics when 
assessing DNA qualification through a similar approach used by Agan (2013) in order to identify 
sex offender registrable offenses. The control for all DNA qualified cases are those cases that did 
not qualify for DNA collection upon the individual’s arrest. Explicitly stated: if an individual 
was arrested under circumstances that did not qualify for DNA collection prior to an effective 
17 
 
date of legislation that would require collection under those conditions, then this analysis does 
not consider those defendants as facing the threat of database entry during plea negotiations. The 
data includes 24,520 cases in which the defendant was arrested under conditions that determined 
the individual to be subject to the threat of database inclusion, or “DNA eligible,” and 80,895 
cases in which defendants were not DNA eligible. Table 1 includes summary statistics for 
demographic characteristics of defendants (1a), as well as adjudication outcomes (1b), for 
defendants that are and are not DNA eligible. The table also details charge outcomes, conditional 
on the defendant pleading guilty. As indicated by the potential for defendants to enter a plea 
negotiation, offenders do not necessarily face the same conviction charge that they were subject 
to during arrest. The BJS data details both arrest and conviction offenses and charges, allowing 
for an intuitive distinction between sentence and charge bargaining to be made. Considering our 
previously stated definitions of charge and sentence bargaining, it is reasonable to assume that an 
individual that is convicted under a different charge (felony or misdemeanor) and pled guilty 
negotiated a charge bargain with their counsel. Similarly, we could assume that a sentence 
bargain was negotiated if the conviction and arrest charges are equal (conditional on a guilty 
plea). Table 1c shows the distribution of these cases across the cases in which the defendant was 
and was not DNA eligible. 
 
 
Empirical Analysis 
This paper considers the effect of DNA databases and of DNA criminal profiling on plea 
behavior by estimating how negotiation behavior by a defendant charged with some crime under 
a given set of conditions changed after legislation went into effect that required an individual 
charged with the same crime (under the same conditions) to have their DNA sample collected, 
18 
 
processed and entered into a database. We are not able to rely on within-year-state variation 
across cases because the dataset only includes cases filed in May and would either qualify for 
collection or not, i.e. the variation in DNA eligibility occurs at the state-year level. Including 
these fixed-effects would control for variation such that the only variation present in a given year 
(in a given state) would be differences among those charged with different crimes. This is 
problematic since those defendants charged with DNA eligible crimes are inherently different 
than those charged with crimes for which the defendant is ineligible for DNA collection. 
A difference-in-differences identification strategy controls for all within state-year shocks to 
negotiation behavior that equally affect all defendants by estimating how plea bargaining 
changes for DNA eligible defendants after legislation goes into effect relative to how this 
behavior changed for those that are not required to submit a DNA sample for their arrest charge. 
The treatment group consists of defendants charged with some crime under a given set of 
conditions at arrest that requires them to have their DNA sample collected if convicted of their 
arrest charge, while the control group is those defendants with arrest charges and conditions that 
would not qualify them for database entry if convicted of that charge. Thus, the DD estimation 
equation42 is: 
Pr(𝑃𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽1(𝐷𝑁𝐴𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑠,𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖 + 𝛾𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑠,𝑡    (1) 
Such that i indexes cases, s indexes states and t indexes year. DNAEligibles,t is an indicator 
variable that defines whether the case was DNA eligible at arrest, Xi is a vector includes 
demographic characteristics and γs is state-fixed effects. Pleai,t is an indicator variable specifying 
whether a case resulted in a guilty plea,43 and the model estimates the effect of DNA qualifying 
                                                             
42 Estimated using a generalized linear model (GLM). 
43 Pleai,t = 1 regardless of whether the individual plead guilty to the same crime for which they were charged with 
at arrest. 
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legislation on the likelihood that a case results in a guilty plea. The difference-in-differences 
coefficient, β1, estimates the effect of legislation that qualifies cases for DNA collection44 on the 
likelihood of pleading guilty for defendants arrested for qualifying cases relative to those 
arrested under charges that would not require the individual to submit a DNA profile if convicted 
of their crimes. Four models, each conditional on a different plea case, are included below. These 
provide insight into how DNA eligibility influences sentence and charge bargaining outcomes by 
considering cases in which offense and conviction charges were and were not equal, 
respectively. 
As stated above, we are also interested in what impact DNA collection eligibility may have on a 
negotiating defendant’s perception of sentencing and whether the treat of database entry 
increases defendant willingness to accept harsher sentencing in exchange for lesser charges that 
would allow them to avoid database entry. The sentencing effect estimation equation is: 
𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡,𝑘 = 𝛽1(𝐷𝑁𝐴𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑠,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝑋𝑖) + 𝛾𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 (2) 
such that SentenceOutcomei,t,k measures the type of sentencing, conditional on conviction, for 
case i that is sentenced to adjudication outcome k.45 This equation estimates, conditional on a 
guilty plea, how DNA eligible cases are distributed across sentencing outcomes (probation, jail 
time and prison time). It is important to note that sentencing is conditional on conviction and that 
the relationship between conviction and DNA eligibility may reduce the internal validity of these 
model estimates. However, the findings are useful in that the estimates provide a direct (though 
not necessarily causal) insight into the relationship between DNA eligibility and sentencing that 
the model estimating the probability that offenders plead to a crime equivalent to their arrest 
charge does not allow. 
                                                             
44 This can be thought of as estimating what effects may result as DNA database eligibility expands.  
45 Sentencing outcomes are categorized by probation, jail time and prison time. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
 
Table 2 shows estimates of the described difference-in-differences models, detailing the effect of 
DNA eligibility on the propensity of a defendant to plead guilty and how they react to DNA 
eligibility during plea negotiations. The first column simply estimates the probability that the 
outcome of a given case was determined by the defendant pleading guilty, while the remaining 
three columns provide estimates for the probability that a defendant agreed to one of our 
previously defined plea types. The coefficient of interest, the difference-in-differences estimator 
for DNA eligibility, is significant in all but one of the model estimates. The first model shows 
that cases in which the defendant is eligible for database inclusion as determined by the 
conditions of their arrest are 7.1% less likely to end in a plea bargain relative to the control group 
of offenders whose arrest conditions do not qualify them for DNA eligibility. 
 
 
The models estimated in columns (2) through (4) are variations on the initial model, varying by 
the type of plea bargain a defendant enters, conditional on the case concluding with a guilty plea. 
The second model considers the probability that an offender’s conviction charge, determined by 
a guilty plea, is equivalent to their arrest charge. As described above, these conditions indicate 
that the defendant has agreed to a sentence bargain (the prosecutor has agreed to recommend a 
shorter or less severe sentence for a certain charge to which the defendant has agreed to plead 
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guilty). The DID coefficient shows that cases in which the defendant faces database inclusion are 
8.8% less likely to end in a plea bargain (such that the defendant’s arrest and conviction charges 
are equivalent) relative to offenders that are not DNA eligible, indicating that DNA eligible 
offenders are less likely to enter into a sentence bargain relative to those that are not eligible. The 
third model estimates the probability that a DNA eligible defendant pleads guilty to a felony 
charge that is different than their arrest charge, which we assume to indicate that the defendant 
entered a charge bargain with the prosecution. The model estimate shows that DNA eligible 
offenders are 2.6% more likely to plead guilty to a different felony charge relative to those that 
are not subject to DNA collection and are, therefore, more likely to plead guilty in response to a 
charge bargain. The last model that would provide alternative insight concerning charge 
bargaining (since a misdemeanor conviction charge necessarily differs from a felony arrest 
charge) does not yield positive results. 
Identifying what relationship exists between sentencing outcomes determined through plea 
negotiations and DNA eligibility may help us to understand how defendants and/or the 
prosecution perceive the relative importance of DNA registration and time spent incarcerated. In 
addition to conviction charges determining whether an offender’s DNA profile will entered into 
state and national databases, however, the decided sentencing for a defendant shapes DNA 
eligibility. This relationship proves problematic when seeking to independently understand the 
effect of DNA eligibility on sentencing outcomes. Furthermore, the ability to differentiate 
between defendant and prosecutor sentencing preferences is limited. Conditioning estimate 
interpretations on these considerations, we examine the distribution of DNA eligible cases, 
conditional on the defendant pleading guilty, across three potential sentencing outcomes: prison 
time, jail time, or probation. The resulting estimates are shown in Table 3. 
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The DID coefficient in the first estimated model, which considers the probability that a DNA 
eligible offender that pleads guilty will spend time in jail, is insignificant. However, the model 
estimates in columns (2) and (3) show that plea negotiating defendants that face database 
inclusion are 3.9% less likely to spend jail time and 2.8% less likely to be placed on probation. 
 
Robustness 
 
A key assumption that must be met for difference-in-differences identification to be internally 
valid is common pre-treatment trends in the various response variables shared by the DNA 
eligible (treatment) and ineligible (control) groups. In other words, the DID coefficient must be 
shown to be unbiased. Consider the model that estimates the probability that a defendant pleads 
guilty: there may exist varying levels of the error term across states as new DNA profiling 
legislation is passed, but this must be random in terms of the change in the error term for the 
common pre-treatment trends assumption to be met. 
For now, consider another threat to validity in that legislation, and perhaps general popular 
perception of DNA profiling technologies, may have a placebo effect on defendant behavior.46 
For example, a controversial bill could be passed in early 1999 that would greatly expand the 
population of offenders that qualify for database inclusion, but would not go into effect until 
January 1, 2000. During the time between the bill being passed and its effective dates, defendants 
                                                             
46 Any placebo effect on prosecutors is likely to be small since this population is most likely to be knowledgeable of 
effective dates for this legislation. 
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may incorrectly understand whether or not they are eligible to be profiled. To test for the 
presence of this placebo effect, the same estimates listed in Table 2 and Table 3 were produced 
with lead DNA eligible variables, artificial indicators that apply treatment (eligibility) to the 
treatment group prior to the actual effective date of legislation. 
 
Table 4 shows that there does not exist any significant placebo effect on defendants besides what 
effect exists with regard to the relationship between DNA eligibility and the defendant pleading 
guilty to a felony charge that is different from the charge under which they were arrested. 
However, the estimate is shown to be relatively small. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION 
 
Plea bargaining generally decreased for defendants whose arrest conditions qualified them for 
potential inclusion in state and national DNA criminal database compared to those ineligible for 
database inclusion. However, the effect of DNA eligibility on plea bargaining behavior varied 
across plea outcomes. Conditional on a guilty plea, a case was less likely to end with equivalent 
arrest and conviction offenses (sentence bargaining) and more likely to end in the defendant 
pleading to a different felony offense than that with which they were charged at arrest (charge 
bargaining) when the defendant is required to consider the impact of their potential DNA 
profiling during plea negotiations. 
The estimates detailed provide evidence that plea bargaining is used defendants and/or 
prosecutors to assist offenders in avoiding being DNA profiled and included in criminal justice 
databases. Following legislation expanding database eligibility, newly treated populations are 
estimated to be less likely to accept a sentencing bargain and more likely to accept a charge 
bargain, relative to ineligible populations and conditional on pleading guilty. This implies that 
defendants that are eligible and plead guilty, as well as prosecutors, collectively place less 
emphasis on shortening and/or lessening sentences, while being more likely to negotiate different 
(and often less severe) charges that may allow offenders to avoid collection. In the BJS State 
Court Process Statistics, 24,520 cases qualified defendants for DNA collection, but only 9,358 
were convicted of crimes that ensured the offender would be profiled. It is important to keep in 
mind that, within the time frame detailed by the dataset, most passed legislation qualified 
offenders for inclusion upon conviction or incarceration. In recent years, legislation has trended 
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towards expanding eligibility for many groups so that offenders are eligible for collection upon 
arrest. Inclusion in databases is likely to affect the behavior of criminals following their release 
from incarceration (or probation), e.g. propensity for recidivism conditional on database 
inclusion. 
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